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Toward an Interstate Standard of Equal 
Protection of the Laws: A Speculative Essay 
Arthur S. Miller* 
Jeffrey H. Bowman** 
Today, the fourteenth amendment embodies much of what 
has become our natural-law Constitution. After a century, the 
amendment stands as both a symbol of national unity and a 
practical guarantee of nationally established rights. 
-Kenneth L. Karst * * * 
"During the twentieth century, the United States became a 
united state. Given the world and national history of our trou- 
bled century, that was probably inevitable, and there is surely 
no turning back . . . ."I That comment by Professor Theodore 
Lowi is the basic theme of this essay, which suggests that the 
time has come for our constitutional law to recognize that we are 
indeed a "united state." The immediate focus will be upon equal 
protection of the laws, an express limitation on the states only, 
but a concept that is at times "incorporated" into the fifth 
amendment's due process limitation on the federal government. 
We argue for a national-an interstate-standard for equal pro- 
tection, predicated on the basic position that the term, "the 
laws," in the fourteenth amendment should be interpreted to 
mean more than those of one state or one jurisdiction only. 
That, to be sure, cuts against the grain of orthodox equal 
protection doctrine. But it is the next logical step for equal pro- 
tection interpretation to take. In a well-known sentence, Archi- 
bald Cox maintained that "[olnce loosed, the idea of equality is 
* Professor Emeritus of Law, The George Washington University. 
** J.D., The George Washington University, 1979. This author is an attorney in the 
general counsel's office of the Federal Election Commission. The opinions in the Article 
are personal to the authors and should not be attributed to the Cornmiision. 
*** Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at Athens: The Fourteenth Amend- 
ment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 383, 404. 
1. T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 295 (2d ed. 1979). 
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not easily cabined."' Surely that is accurate. A little over a half- 
century ago, Justice Holmes, in an opinion his idolators would 
like to forget, called equal protection the usual last resort of con- 
stitutional arguments-and brusquely dismissed Carrie Buck's 
plea that she should not be involuntarily sterilized.. Since then 
the idea of equal protection has indeed been loosed so that com- 
mentators routinely talk about the "new" or "substantive" equal 
protection. 
That familiar learning will not be retraced here. Nor is this 
essay an exhaustive delineation of all of the nuances and permu- 
tations of interstate equal protection; rather, it is a speculative 
essay, designed more to stimulate debate than to answer all of 
the questions of such a doctrinal extension. We recognize that it 
will take a considerable mental leap into the dark future for 
others to grasp and agree with our net conclusion. The discus- 
sion below begins with an examination of the "new" jurispru- 
dence of the Supreme Court, which cannot be traced beyond 
Cooper u. Aaron4 in 1958, and then proceeds to set forth the 
arguments, pro and con, for interstate equal protection. The res- 
urrection of substantive due process with its significant elements 
of equal protection, in conjunction with the concept of "reverse 
incorporation" and the potential meaning of "national citizen- 




11. THE HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT OF EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
The nation began in 1789 without an equality principle in 
Constitution, it having been dropped after enunciation in 
Declaration of Independence. Only when the Civil War pro- 
duced the fourteenth amendment did one appear-as a limita- 
tion on the states alone, not on the federal government. Only in 
this century-and, then, mostly since 1954-has the principle 
been applied to the federal govern~nent.~ This essay does not 
trace that development, for Professor Karst's recent discussion 
of the congruence between the equality protections of the four- 
2. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1 s  Term-Foreword: Constitutionul Adjudication 
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV L. REV. 91 (1966). 
3. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
4. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
5. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guar- 
antee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1977). 
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teenth and fifth amendments ably sets out the several considera- 
tions therein? 
Historically, equal protection provides a classic illustration 
of one aspect of the "living" or "operative" Constitution. The 
words in the document remain the same, but their content con- 
tinues to change through time. That disturbs some commenta- 
tors, who believe that we have an "imperial judiciary" or "gov- 
ernment by judiciary."' Those accusations are hardly accurate, 
even though their basis-that the Supreme Court has read new 
meaning into ancient clauses-is correct. There should be no 
surprise that a further extension of equal protection is recom- 
mended. Cardozo once maintained that there were fields in the 
"domain of law where fundamental conceptions have been devel- 
oped to their uttermost conclusions by the organon of 10gic."~ 
He was not then talking about the Constitution; and it is by no 
means clear that he was correct. The genius of American law, 
including the area of "constitutional common law,"@ is that prin- 
ciples have a way of being ameliorated in a sort of Hegelian syn- 
thesis, or of striking some type of Aristotelian golden mean, 
rather than being extended to the outermoat limits of their logic. 
To cite but one relevant example, Shelley u. Kramerlo could 
have revolutionized private law; but it has not. The principle has 
scarcely been extended since 1948. Nevertheless, as de Toc- 
queville noted a century and a half ago, there seems to be a 
marked tendency toward egalitarianism in the United States.ll 
That, according to the late Professor Alexander Bickel,lg has 
been one of the drummers to which the Supreme Court has 
marched in recent decades. The history of Supreme Court law- 
making since Buck u. Bell evidences the accuracy of Bickel's 
observation. 
It is not that the actual social structure in the United States 
has been altered substantially-as Bickel implied-because it 
has not. No massive redistribution of wealth has occurred, al- 
though members of the working class have been able to catch at 
6. Karst, supra note ***. 
7. E.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DE- 
CREE (1976); Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PUB. INTEREST 104 (1975). 
8. SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 294 (M. Hall ed. 1947). 
9. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreward: Constitutional Com- 
mon Law, 89 HAW. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
10. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
11. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (F. Borren ed. la). 
12. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 103 (1970). 
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least some crumbs from the groaning table of economic opulence 
that is the United States. The expansion of equal protection law 
occurred almost entirely during America's true "golden 
age9'-that time from about 1945 to 1970 when the dollar was 
king and American military might supreme, when commentators 
could seriously talk about a Pax Americana, and when economic 
growth within the United States seemed to know no bounds.13 
However, in the last ten years recognition of "the limits to 
growth" and the coming of a steady-state economy has so al- 
tered the social milieu1' in which constitutional norms are ap- 
plied that one must recognize that discussions of constitutional 
issues outside of the social context in which they arise tend, 
more and more, to be mere sterile exercises in doctrinal exege- 
sis-helpful perhaps to lawyers but not at all helpful to the law- 
yer-judges who sit upon the High Bench.16 The point is obvious. 
At least, it should be obvious; but it is little acknowledged in the 
law journals and elsewhere in the legal profession. "Legal- 
ism9'-the notion that law is there, separate and apart from the 
warp and woof of society-still is the prevailing ideology of law- 
yers.'. That is a pathetic fallacy, but one routinely purveyed to 
thousands of law students. 
A full contextual analysis is not possible within the scope of 
this essay. SufEce it merely to draw attention to Professor Lester 
C. Thurow's insightful book, The Zero-Sum Society? He main- 
tains that the political (for which, read constitutional) order is 
in disarray, unable to deal effectively with the consequences of 
burgeoning and coalescing economic problems such as inflation, 
unemployment, slow growth, low productivity, environmental 
decay, economic discrimination, and inequality, because massive 
distributional actions must be taken. "In the past," Thurow 
says, "political and economic power was distributed in such a 
way that substantial economic losses could be imposed on parts 
of the population . . . . Economic losses were allocated to par- 
ticular powerless groups rather than spread across the popula- 
tion. These groups are no longer willing to accept losses and are 
13. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DI TATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF 
CONTROL (1981). 
14. See W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1976). 
15. For examples, see almwt any issue of the Supreme Court Review and any of the 
Harvard Law Review's annual summaries of Supreme Court activities. 
16. See J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964). 
17. L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY (1980). 
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able to raise substantially the costs for those who wish to impose 
losses upon them? 
The meaning in political or constitutional terms is paradoxi- 
cal: pluralism as a political order is breaking down simply be- 
cause it has been succes~ful.~@ Thurow ends his important dis- 
cussion of "the zero-sum society" with these ominous words: 
As we head into the 19808, it is well to remember that 
there is really only one important question in political econ- 
omy. If elected, whose income do you and your party propose 
to cut in the process of solving the economic problems facing 
us? Our economy and the solutions to its problems have a sub- 
stantial zero-sum element. Our economic life would be easier if 
this were not true, but we are going to have to learn to play a 
zero-sum economic game. If we cannot learn, or prefer to pre- 
tend that the zero-sum problem does not exist, we are simply 
going to faiPO 
Law, including constitutional law, is a reflection of economics. A 
number of zero-sum Supreme Court decisions on equal protec- 
tion have been rendered in recent years-Bakke," Weber,22 
Rodrigue~,'~ and F u l l i l ~ v e ~ ~  are perhaps the outstanding exam- 
ples. The Justices are playing a zero-sum economics game while 
using lawyers' language-an example of how economists and 
lawyers can be talking about the same thing but using different 
word symbols, and thus not communicating at  all (as John R. 
Commons observed in 1950)? 
In sum, then, equal protection law and its analysis by courts 
and commentators alike should be seen in the context of the 
zero-sum society. That society is, as Lowi says, a "united state." 
The thesis of this essay is that it is both feasible and desirable to 
think of equal protection as a national standard, one that recog- 
nizes "the claims of equal national citizenship" in a "national 
c~rnrnunity, '~~ with that standard being interstate, not intra- 
18. Id. at 12. 
19. See A. Miller, Oracb in the Marble Palace: Politics and the Supreme Court 
(manuscript in possession of author); T. LOWI, supra note 1. See also H. KARIEL, THE 
DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM (1961). 
L. THUROW, supra note 17, at 214. 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
J. COMMONS, Tm ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 309-14 (1950). 
Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the 
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state. The fourteenth amendment, of course, speaks in terms of 
no state denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. That delphic command is far from clear, 
as dozens of cases illustrate. But those decisions revolve around 
two basic questions-what is state action? and what is equal 
protection?-and one important, but seldom discussed, ques- 
tion: what is a person? It is familiar learning that state action 
has been an evolving concept whose development is not yet over, 
and that equal protection is determined by different standards 
according to the factual contexts in which issues arise. As for the 
problem of who or what is a person, a tribunal that without ar- 
gument conceded that the disembodied entities called corpora- 
tions are constitutional personsa7 almost a century later refused 
that status to a f e t~s .3~  
The meaning of the word, "laws," in the fourteenth amend- 
ment has not been subjected to rigorous analysis by scholars. 
Historically, of course, it meant the laws of a given state or of a 
given jurisdiction within one state. At most, the Court, as in 
Yick Wo v. Hopkinsyw has been willing at times to penetrate the 
thicket of administration and determine how given statutes or 
ordinances are administered; or it has made, as in PalmePo and 
Davisysl the motivation of legislators the determining criterion. 
In Sun Antonio School District v. Rodr igue~,~~ a Court majority 
rejected disparities of financing between school districts, finding 
no equal protection violation. 
If one takes an antiquarian view of constitutional interpre- 
tation, resting primarily on stare decisis and ultimately on the 
intentions of those who wrote the fourteenth amendment, then 
the answer to the question-should there be an interstate stan- 
dard of equal protection?-is easy: No. But the Justices, save 
when they wished, and that is seldom, have never been circum- 
scribed by such a rigid view of interpretation. Those who ac- 
knowledge, in Professor Ray Forrester's language, "truth in 
judging,"ss readily concede that the Justices make up the law as 
they go along-always have, as Justice White said in Mirunda v. 
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HAW. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
Forrester, Are We Ready for %th in Judging?, 63 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977). 
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ArizonaM-and no doubt will continue to do so as long as the 
Court functions. Indeed, as Justice Brennan flatly stated in 
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,s6 "Under our system, judges 
are not mere umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a 
coordinate branch of government.'" The road, thus, is open for 
new vistas to be seen in equal protection law-and it is one of 
those vistas that we advocate: Equal protection, to repeat, 
should include discriminations among states, with "laws" mean- 
ing the laws of other states as well, whenever fundamental rights 
are at issue. A tribunal that can swallow, without difficulty, the 
notion that an artificial economic collectivity is a person, and 
even extend freedom of speech to it? surely should be able to 
read the word "laws" more expansively. 
That there is a sociological basis for the United States being 
a united state admits of no doubt. Americans are far more 
closely knit together today, because of scientific and technologi- 
cal developments in transportation, communications, and other 
economic activities, than were their predecessors in 1787, 1800, 
1850, or even 1900. There have been more changes in the human 
condition in the little more than a century since the fourteenth 
amendment was placed in the Constitution than in known 
human history before 1868. We are in the midst today of a third 
industrial revolution, one which bids fair to alter the environ- 
ment in which Homo sapiens exist more than either the first or 
second," and one which can only be compared to the agricul- 
tural revolution that occurred eons ago. There should, therefore, 
be little wonder that ancient constitutional mechanisms and in- 
stitutions are being adapted to new social conditions. The scru- 
tiny here is on one of those institutions-the Supreme Court of 
the United States and its "new" jurisprudence of the past quar- 
ter-century. 
Our account, necessarily brief, begins with Cooper u. 
34. 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
35. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
36. Id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
37. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See Miller, On Poli- 
tics, Democracy, and the First Amendment: A Commentary on First National Bank v. 
Bellotti, WASH. & LEZ L. REV. - (1981). 
38. See, e.g., P. LARGE, THE MICRO REVOLUTION (1980); A. BURKFTT & E. WILLIAMS, 
THE SILICON CIVILIZATION (1980). 
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Aaron,3s the Little Rock school desegregation decision of 1958. 
There, in a unique opinion individually signed by all nine Jus- 
tices, the Court unanimously held that defiance of the principle 
of Brown v. Board of Education ( I  & II)'O could not be tolerated, 
and that a Supreme Court decision was "the law of the land."41 
As such, the Court said, it was, under the theory of article VI's 
principle of federal supremacy, superior to and overriding of any 
inconsistent state law or policy. In the words of Professor Philip 
Kurland, "the Court seemed to assume the same scope for its 
decision as the statute [the 1964 Civil Rights Act] could 
claim."42 Kurland goes on to assert that "[a] Supreme Court 
opinion, whatever its merits, cannot seriously be treated as the 
equivalent of a statute for purposes of the Supremacy Clause. 
Nor have they been so treated, however highly the Supreme 
Court itself may regard some of them.'us 
On the latter point, Professor Kurland is technically correct. 
But on the larger matter he surely can be faulted. Decisions of 
the Supreme Court, whether liked or not, are considered to be 
"the law of the land" and thus to be the "equivalent of a statute 
for purposes of the Supremacy Clause." Not only laymen but 
members of the legal profession view those decisions as estab- 
lishing a norm of conduct not unlike a statute. The meaning for 
present purposes is clear: a decision on equal protection in, say, 
a case coming from New York is the law of the land. That means 
that law enforcement personnel in all other states are similarly 
bound even though they could not be held in contempt for refus- 
ing to adhere to the decision. That, at least, is the inescapable 
inference to be drawn from such decisions as Shapiro v. Thomp- 
son." There should not be, as Professor Karst has said in quot- 
ing Cicero, "one law at Rome and another at at hen^."^' 
Although it is logically impossible to infer a general princi- 
ple from a particular one, that is precisely what is being done. 
Law is far from the logical endeavor that some think it is. Jus- 
tice Felix Frankfurter said it well in 1954: 
39. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
41. 358 U.S. at 18. 
42. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 185 (1970). 
43. Id. at 186. 
44. 394 US. 618 (1969). 
45. Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at Athens: The Fourteenth Amend- 
ment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 383, 404 (1972). 
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Human society keeps changing. Needs emerge, first vaguely 
felt and unexpressed, imperceptibly gathering strength, stead- 
ily becoming more and more exigent, generating a force which, 
if left unheeded and denied response so as to satisfy the im- 
pulse behind it at least in part, may burst forth with an inten- 
sity that exacts more than reasonable satisfaction. Law as the 
response to those needs is not merely a system of logical de- 
duction, though considerations of logic are far from irrelevant. 
Law presupposes sociological wisdom as well as logical 
unfolding.'" 
One of the considerations of logic that distinctly is not relevant 
is the plain and simple proposition that a Supreme Court deci- 
sion in a single case (even though not a class action) is the state- 
ment of a general norm. Some language of Chief Justice Fred 
Vinson is apposite: "[Ylou are," he told the American Bar Asso- 
ciation, "in a sense, prosecuting or defending class actions; . . . 
you represent not only your clients, but tremendously important 
principles, upon which are based the plans, hopes, and aspira- 
tions of a great many people throughout the country."47 In other 
words, cases are chosen not in the interests of the litigants but 
in the interests of the development of the law-the development 
of general principles. The Court rules not only for the parties at 
the bar, but for generations yet unborn. The "class actions" that 
are constitutional cases are, to be sure, "backdoor" or de facto 
class actions, for often, perhaps usually, litigation is solely be- 
tween the parties before the Court. (They can also validly be 
called "backdoor" advisory  opinion^.)^^ However, once the Jus- 
tices have decided a dispute on the merits the result has the 
practical, but not the technical, effect of binding everyone simi- 
larly situated throughout the nation. The meaning should be 
clear: the Court has assumed "the role of a third legislative 
chamber."4a Some decry thatFO but most do not deny it. For bet- 
ter or for worse, something akin to, but not exactly the same as, 
46. F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 35 (1956) (emphasis added). 
47. Address by Chief Justice Vinson to the American Bar Association (Sept. 7, 
1949), reprinted in 69 S. Ct. v, vi (1949). See Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De 
Facto Class Actions, - U .  DET. J. URB. L. - (1981). 
48. See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow 
of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, in A. IMIUER, THE SUPREME 
COURT 261 (1978). 
49. L. HAND, THE BIU OF RIGHTS 55 (1958). 
50. See, e.g., Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361 (1979); 
Bridwell, The Scope of Judicial Review: A Dirge for the Theorists of Majority Rule?, 31 
S.C.L. REV. 617 (1980). 
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what the Framers refused to put into the Constitution when 
drafted in 1787-a Council of Revision6'--has been created by 
judicial assertion and public acquiescence. 
That means, however, merely that a single Supreme Court 
decision can have a statute-like efkect. As with Congress, the 
Justices feel free to "repeal" previous decisions and to "enact" 
others, for as Justice William 0. Douglas said in Glidden v. Zda- 
nok, constitutional questions are "always open.'" There is an- 
other, more portentious development in the new jurisprudence, 
heralded by Cooper v. Aaron-the propensity of the Court at 
times, but far from always, to set forth its rulings in deliberate 
general language. Cooper started it, but the process has not 
ended. The decisions are not many, but they are significant. 
They include, but are not limited to Reynolds v. S i m P  (one 
person/one vote); Miranda u. ArizonaU (on what police officers 
should do with criminal suspects); Green v. School BoardB6 (in 
which an "affirmative duty" was imposed upon school boards to 
integrate public schools); the abortion casesM (setting forth 
when a woman may voluntarily have an abortion based on a tri- 
mester system); and United States u. Snepp6' (where a contrac- 
tual agreement was held to override first amendment rights). 
The point is that in these illustrative cases, the Justices openly 
and outwardly used statutory-like language and wrote opinions 
couched in general terms (for the entire nation) and with little 
regard for the actual litigants. Clarence Gideon, to take another 
example, was of little importance as an individual to the Court; 
his significance was that the facts of his incarceration by Florida 
provided a looked-for stimulus to make a general rule about the 
availability of counsel in noncapital criminal cases." Support for 
the point being made may be found in Piekering u. School 
Board,6@ where Justice Marshall expressly refused to extend the 
"rule of the case" beyond the specific facts of the Piekering 
51. Under Randolph's proposed Council of Revision, every law passed by the legisla- 
ture automatically would have been previewed by the judiciary before taking effect. See 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 189 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
370 U.S. 530, 592 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
444 U.S. 507 (1980), rehearing denied, 100 S. Ct. 1668 (1980). 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
391 U.S. 563 (19f38). 
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litigation. 
This is not the time to discuss the matter further. Suffice it 
to conclude that the time-honored result of the adversary sys- 
tem-the production of the "law of the case9'-is slowly being 
changed to mean the "law of the land."60 From that may be de- 
rived the proposition that the "laws" covered by equal protec- 
tion should have an interstate dimension in those areas consid- 
ered to be "fundamental rights." That is the ultimate meaning 
of Cooper v. Aaron. Our discussion now narrows to a case study 
on voting, which will be used as an example for the larger 
principle. 
IV. ENFRANCHISING THE INDEPENDENT VOTER 
In 1980 some 35 states held a presidential primary, deter- 
mining over 65 percent of each convention's votes. Yet voters in 
sixteen of these states, who did not wish to be publicly affiliated 
with a political party, were statutorily barred from voting in 
their state's primary. These states selected a total of 1,324 dele- 
gates to the Democratic and 735 delegates to the Republican 
National Conventions. Statutes there prescribe a "closed pri- 
mary," by which voting is restricted to those who, in some man- 
ner and at some time prior to voting, publicly declare their afFli- 
ation with a political party and have that affiliation recorded. 
The consequence is a gross disenfranchisement of millions of 
Americans that raises serious questions about the most signifi- 
cant voting bloc in the country, the independent voters.61 Is 
60. Compare Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), with President Lincoln's views: 
Judicial decisions "must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object 
of the suit," and "while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in 
all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government," nonetheless, 
if the policy of the Government is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the 
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between par- 
ties in personal actions the people wil l  have ceased to be their own rulers, hav- 
ing to that extent practically assigned their Government into the hands of that 
eminent tribunal. 
Quoted in J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 213 (1980). 
See also R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 96-104 (1941) (discussing 
how national monetary policy was set by the Supreme Court in a lawsuit between private 
parties involving the sum of $15.60). 
61. There is a growing movement away from the two major political parties. A re- 
cent Gallup Poll, conducted from November 1980 to February 1981, indicates that 31% 
of the American voters consider themselves to be "independents." (42% were Democrats 
and 29% were Republicans). N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,1981, at 30, col. 2. Moreover, it is likely 
that this figure wil l  continue to grow in future elections since 45% of the voters under 30 
classify themselves as independents. N. NIE, S. VERBA, & J. PBTROCSK, THE CHANGING 
286 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
their fundamental right to vote fatally diluted? And, if so, are 
they being accorded equal protection of the laws? 
Political parties have existed in this nation for over 175 
years and today dominate the presidential nominating process. 
In most elections, participation in the political party nominating 
process is the sine qua non to meaningful participation in the 
electoral process. As the impetus for increased popular partici- 
pation in the nominating process has grown from the progressive 
movement of the early twentieth century:2 the traditional party 
caucus has been replaced by popularly elected nominating con- 
ventions and by the increased use of direct primaries." Justice 
Pitney's oft-quoted statement in Newberry u. United StatesU 
that "every voter comes to the polls on the day of the general 
election confined in his choice to those few candidates who have 
received party  nomination^"^^ evidences early judicial recogni- 
tion of the important role political parties and primary elections 
play in the electoral process. 
Beginning with Wendell Wilkie's attempt to use the 1944 
Wisconsin presidential primary as a vehicle for demonstrating 
his popular support within the Republican Party, primary com- 
petition has become a feature of every presidential election? 
Primaries played an especially important role in the campaigns 
for the Republican nominations in 1948 (Stassen, Dewey, and 
AMERICAN VOTER 64 (1976). 
62. States that have passed primary election laws have done so because 
"[c]onventions were thought to be susceptible to manipulation by party leaders and a 
wide-spread faith existed that more popular participation would have a cleansing effect 
on politics." V. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 409 (5th ed. 1964). 
Similarly, Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., called for the adoption of the primary, arguing, 
No longer . . . will there stand between the voter and the official a political 
machine with a complicated system of caucuses and conventions, by the easy 
manipulation of which it thwarts the will of the voter and rules of official con- 
duct . . . . If the voter is competent to cast his ballot at the general election 
for the official of his choice, he is equally competent to vote directly at the 
primary election for the nomination of the candidates of his choice. 
Speech by Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., accepting nomination for governor, August 8,1900. 
Interestingly, this speech was not quoted in TORRELLE, LAFOLLETTE'S POLITICAL P ~ a o s o -  
PHY 36-37 (1920), as reported in LaFollette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 492-93, 
287 N.W.2d 519, 527 (1980). 
63. C. MEXIAM & R. OVERACKER, P IMARY ELECTIONS 60-67 (1928). 
64. 256 U.S. 232 (1921). 
65. Id. at 286 (Pitney, J., dissenting). 
66. Presidential primaries, of course, have been on the American political scene 
longer than this. Their effect on the party nominating process, however, was question- 
able. In 1912, for example, Theodore Roosevelt won 9 out of 12 primaries yet lost his 
race against President William Howard Taft for the Republican Party nomination. 
2751 EQUAL PROTECTION 287 
Taft), 1952 (Eisenhower and Taft), 1964 (Goldwater and Rocke- 
feller), 1976 (Ford and Reagan), and 1980 (Reagan and Bush); 
and the Democratic nominations in 1952 (Kefauver? Russell, 
and Truman-supported favorite sons), 1956 (Stevenson and 
Kefauver), 1960 (Kennedy and Humphrey), 1968 (McCarthy, 
Kennedy, and Johnson-supported favorite sons), 1972 (Mc- 
Govern, Humphrey, Muskie, Wallace and Jackson), 1976 (Carter 
and Udall) and 1980 (Carter and Kennedy)." 
Moreover, it is clear that the winners of the Democratic and 
Republican Party nominations are historically the only viable 
candidates for election to the presiden~y.~~ Professor R. A. Dahl, 
writing in 1964, noted the dominance of the two-party system 
with respect to both the executive and legislative branches: 
Since 1860 every presidential election has been won by ei- 
ther a Democrat or a Republican; in only four presidential 
elections during that period has a third party ever cairied a 
single state. . . . Since 1862 one of the two parties has always 
had a clear majority of seats in the House; in the Senate, in- 
dependents or third party members have prevented a clear ma- 
jority during a total of ten years. The number of seats held by 
third party members is almost always extremely low.70 
Nomination by a recognized party substantially reduces the 
scope of a citizen's real choice in the general election. Today, the 
nomination process is controlled by voting in the primary elec- 
tions (and caucuses). Theodore H. White has appraised the im- 
67. In 1952, Senator Kefauver won 12 of the 16 presidential primaries, yet the nomi- 
nation went to Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, who had entered no primaries. 
68. For the official primary returns from 1948-1972, see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 
GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 332-49 (1975). For the 1976 primary returns, see CONGRES- 
SIONAL QUARTERLY, POLITICS IN AMERICA 142-47 (1979). 
69. Indeed, the District of Columbia Circuit recently recognized this phenomenon: 
Regular presidential contests between the Republican and Democratic parties 
began,in 1852. However, the present Democratic Party can trace its origins to 
the Democratic Republican Party which Thomas Jefferson began to assemble 
even before the end of Washington's first term. H. BONE, AMERICAN POLITICS 
AND THE PARTY SYSTEM, 28-30 (1971). A case can likewise be made that Hamil- 
ton's Federalists and subsequently the Whig Party were the predecessors of 
the present Republican Party. E. S m ,  AMERICAN PARTIES AND ELECTIONS 205 
(1927). If so, then the only Presidents who may plausibly claim not to be the 
products of the two-party rivalry are James Monroe and John Quincy Adams, 
who served during a sort of party "interregnum" after the decline of the Feder- 
alists and before the rise of the Whigs. See Bone, supra, at 28. 
Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 581, n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976). 
70. R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 214 (1967). 
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portance of the primary election this way: 
Primaries had already thus become, by 1972, one of the 
great drive engines of American politics-for a primary is a 
deed. All else in politics, except money, is words--comment, 
rhetoric, analysis, polls. But a primary is a fact. There is a 
hardness to such a fact, especially if the victory is a contested 
one. With the lift of such an event, a candidate can compel 
attention, build votes, change minds. It is the underdog's clas- 
sic route to power in America." 
Presidential primaries should be viewed for what they actu- 
ally are, integral parts of the general election, controlling the 
choices of those who have the right to vote. Because of this de- 
terminative role, primary outcomes should be truly representa- 
tive of all the voters, not merely of avowed party members. A 
recent but single United States Supreme Court case interferes 
with this position. 
A. The LaFollette Case 
In Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette," 
the Supreme Court considered a challenge by the National Dem- 
ocratic Party to Wisconsin's open primary law." The Wisconsin 
law permits all qualified voters to cast ballots in the presidential 
preference primary regardless of their party affiliation. W iscon- 
sin delegates to the national convention are selected by party 
members at statewide party caucuses, but they are bound by 
state statute to vote in accordance with the preferences ex- 
pressed in the primary. However, this open primary approach 
conflicts with the rules of the Democratic Party which decree 
that only those persons who openly and publicly declare their 
adherence to the principles of the Democratic Party may partici- 
pate in the party's presidential preference primary. The Na- 
tional Party argued that as a result of Wisconsin's failure to re- 
strict its Democratic primary to publicly declared party 
members, the popularity of various candidates within the party 
was distorted. The Party further argued that the binding open 
71. T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1972 at 71 (1973). 
72. 101 S. Ct. 1010 (1981). 
73. The "open primary" is so named because the "voter is not required to declare 
publicly a party preference or to have that preference publicly recorded. Each voter 
makes a choice of party in the privacy of the voting booth." 93 Wis. 2d at 485, 287 
N.W.2d at 523. 
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primary would "infringe severely on the Democratic Party's ef- 
fort to conduct its affairs."74 
A divided Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, ruled 
that Wisconsin could not bind the Democratic Party to honor 
the results of the open primary at its national convention. Jus- 
tice Stewart found that the "issue is whether the state may com- 
pel the National Party to seat a delegation chosen in a way that 
violates the rules of the Party."76 He asserted that resolution of 
this issue was controlled by the Court's decision in Cousins v. 
W i g o d ~ . ~ ~  There, the Court held that the 1972 Democratic Na- 
tional Convention had the right to refuse to seat an Illinois dele- 
gation that was chosen in accordance with state law but that vio- 
lated party rules regarding participation of minorities, women 
and young people. In LaFollette, the Court found that "the 
members of the National Party, speaking through their rules, 
chose to define their associational rights by limiting those who 
could participate in the processes leading to the selection of del- 
egates to the National C~nvention."~~ Because of this the Court 
concluded that "a State, or a court, may not constitutionally 
substitute its judgment for that of the Party."78 
The Court's analysis is seriously defective on two counts. 
First, the emphasis placed on Cousins is inappropriate. Indeed, 
as Justice Powell recognized in dissent, "[Tlhe facts of this case 
present issues that differ considerably from those we dealt with 
in Cousins."7s In Cousins the Court was concerned that the dele- 
gates who vote on party rules and procedure, adopt a party plat- 
form, and vote for party officers be party members chosen in 
accordance with party rules and not a court order. There, "suf- 
frage was exercised at  the primary election to elect delegates to a 
National Party Con~ention."~~ In LaFol let te the selection of in- 
dividual delegates to the National Convention was not at issue 
because the delegate selection process was under the exclusive 
control of the Democratic Party. Wisconsin law provides that 
. 74. Brief for Appellants at 33, Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette, 
101 S. Ct. 1010 (1981). 
75. Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette, 101 S. Ct. at 1018. 
76. 419 U.S. 477 (1975). 
77. 101 S. Ct. at 1019. 
78. Id. at 1020. Justice Stewart merely restated the question at issue, and then used 
the question as a "reason." A conclusion is not a reason, even when uttered by a Su- 
preme Court Justice. 
79. Id. at 1022. (Powell, J., dissenting). 
80. 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975). 
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the "method of selecting the delegates or alternates [is] deter- 
mined by the state party organization.'"' No delegates are se- 
lected by the voter in Wisconsin. Once a delegate is elected, 
through whatever manner or process, Wisconsin law requires 
only that the delegate "vote in accord with the results of the 
open primary election."82 As Justice Powell noted, "While this 
regulation affecting participation in the primary is hardly insig- 
nificant, it differs substantially from the direct state interference 
in delegate selection at issue in Cou~ins."~~ 
Secondly, in an opinion which exalts form over substance, 
Justice Stewart, under the guise of associational rights, has given 
the two major parties a blank check to make rules for them- 
selves and for all others affected by the parties' rules. In finding 
that "a State or a court may not constitutionally substitute its 
own judgment for that of a party,"" the Court has gone much 
too far in protecting the right of association. It has in practical 
effect, permitted those who control the major parties to make 
rules for all Americans. When the actions of any association 
have such a profound and far-reaching effect, not only on the 
group itself, but upon a state (as in LaFollette) and, indeed, 
upon the nation as a whole, members of the association should 
be held to have duties beyond that of looking out for their own 
protected rights. The National Democratic Party performs a sig- 
nificant public86 function every four years when it selects one of 
the two major candidates for President of the United States. 
81. Wrs. STAT. ANN. 5 8.12(3)(b) (WEST SUPP. 1980). 
82. Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette, 101 S. Ct. 1010, 1014 
(1981). 
83. Id. at  1023. (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
84. Id. at  1020. Justice Stewart offers no authority in support of this contention. He 
further states: "A political party's choice among the various ways of determining the 
make-up of a State's delegation to the party's national convention is protected by the 
Constitution." Id. Again, Stewart faila to cite authority for support or on point. Instead, 
he refers to Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 585 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976). That is hardly dispositive, particularly 
since Stewart designated it as a "cf." 
85. The public nature of the primary is the extent to which public money is used in 
the primary process. The Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 
U.S.C. $3 9031-9042 (1976), provides limited public financing of presidential primary 
elections by authorizing federal matching payments for certain contributions to eligible 
candidates. The Act establishes a separate account within the United States Treasury 
known as the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account from which the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury transfers funds to candidates whom the Federal Election Commis- 
sion certifies are eligible to receive such funds. As of February 26, 1981, a total of 
$31,309,062.16 had been certified to ten presidential candidates eligible to receive federal 
primary matching funds. 
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The Democratic Party is not a mere "private club"86 primarily 
concerned, like the NAACP, with the associational rights of its 
members. When, as has become obvious, early presidential 
primaries (as in New Hampshire) and even party caucuses (as in 
Iowa) can have significant national ramifications-mainly, it 
seems, because of the mass media-then the privateness of the 
"political associations" should give way to clear recognition of 
their public, indeed national, status. This is what Justice Stew- 
art in his majority opinion failed to perceive," and what, there- 
fore, makes his opinion and the decision faulty.88 
Voting is the first duty of democracy. Indeed, the Founding 
86. 93 Wis. 2d at  515, 287 N.W.2d at  538. 
87. Justice White, as a result of his association with the 1960 campaign of President 
Kennedy, and Chief Justice Burger, as a result of his association with the 1948 presiden- 
tial campaign of Harold Stassen, are the only members of the current Court with even 
minimal national political experience. It has been suggested that 
[i]n matters of political structure and process, . . . judges properly give 
deference to legislators whose work requires them to be in the thick of active 
political engagement. For when judges, particularly those appointed for life, 
come to questions of political process, they almost by definition do not have 
the benefit of current experience. 
Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 380 (1977). To illus- 
trate the point, Judge Leventhal noted, 
In 1916, Felix Frankfurter observed that Charles Evans Hughes, although 
a former governor, was waging a commonplace political campaign that was ut- 
terly lacking in distinction, a condition that he thought was in part due to the 
different nature of the intervening assignment on the Supreme Court where he 
had served with distinction. 
Id. 
88. LaFollette also presents the interesting question of whether the assocational 
rights of the National Party transcend those of the State Party. As Justice Powell 
pointed out: "It is significant that the Democratic Party of Wisconsin, which represents 
those citizens of Wisconsin willing to take part publicly in party affairs, is here defend- 
ing the state law." 101 S. Ct. 1010, 1024 (Powell, J., dissenting). The State Party, origi- 
nally named in the action as respondent with the National Party, responded by agreeing 
that the state law may be validly applied against it and the National Party. The State 
Party thenocross-claimed against the National Party and asked the court to recognize its 
delegation selected in accord with Wisconsin law. The State Party also filed papers in 
support of the Wisconsin law with the Supreme Court. 
The Wisconsin law also had the support of the Democratic controlled state legisla- 
ture. On September 5,1979, by a unanimous vote of the state senate and a 92-1 vote of 
its assembly, the Wisconsin legislature by joint resolution supported the "firm and en- 
during commitment of the people of Wisconsin to the open presidential preference pri- 
mary law as an integral element of Wisconsin's proud tradition of direct and effective 
participatory democracy." Democratic Party v. LaFollette, Docket No. 79-1631 (Febru- 
ary 25, 1981) (Joint Appendix at 75-78). Moreover, on September 14, 1979, a bill in- 
tended to create a modified closed primary was firmly rejected in committee. 93 Wis. 2d 
at 490 n.14, 287 N.W.2d at  526 n.14. 
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Fatherss9 recognized that "[a] fundamental principle of our rep- 
resentative democracy is," in Alexander Hamilton's words, 
" 'that the people should choose whom they please to govern 
them.' As stated by James Madison: 
As each representative will be chosen by a greater number 
. of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be 
more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success 
the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and 
the suffrage of the people being more free will be more likely to 
centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the 
most diffusive and established characters." 
Not only does the Court's approach in LaFollette, with its 
emphasis on the associational rights of party members, seem- 
ingly ignore the importance of the vote in a democracy, but it 
runs counter to the Court's traditionally vigilant interest in pro- 
tecting the right of the voting franchise against state or party 
abridgment. One hundred years ago in Ex parte Siebold,@% the 
Supreme Court held that Congress may enact statutes which 
protect every citizen against state interference with the right to 
vote. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins," the Court recognized that "the 
political franchise of voting" was a "fundamental political 
right,"94 preservative of all other individual rights. During the 
past two decades the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized 
the significance of a citizen's right to vote and has vigorously 
protected it against infringement in any form. In 1964 in Rey- 
nolds v. S i ~ n s , @ ~  the Court stated, 
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a 
free and democratic society. Especially since thd right to exer- 
89. The wisdom and expectations of the drafters of the Constitution have served as 
a foundation for the continued expansion of popular suffrage. Thus, six of the last twelve 
amendments to the Constitution have extended the elective franchise by restricting limi- 
tations thereon and expanding the ambit of protected participation. Amendment XV 
(race, color and previous condition of servitude); Amendment XVII (senatorial elec- 
tions); Amendment XIX (women's suffrage); Amendment XXIII (District of Columbia); 
Amendment XXIV (abolition of the poll tax); Amendment XXVI (18 year-old right to 
vote). 
90. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (quoting Alexander Hamilton, 
from 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 257 (J. Elliot ed. 1876)). 
91. niE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (J. Madison), at 58 (H. Lodge ed. 1888). 
92. 100 U.S. 371 (1880). 
93. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
94. Id. at 370. 
95. 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Although technically dicta, subsequent citation has 
made the Court's language an accurate statement of law. 
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cise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preserva- 
tive of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged in- 
fringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully 
and meticulously scrutini~ed.~ 
The Court decided Wesberry u. Sandersa7 that same year and 
observed that "[nlo right is more precious in a free country than 
that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws 
under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even 
the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is ~ndermined."~~ 
Two years later, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,@@ 
the Court declared the right to vote to be one of the fundamen- 
tal rights protected by the equal protection clause of the four- 
teenth amendment, and concluded that "classifications which 
might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and 
carefully confined."loO Subsequent cases have amplified and con- 
siderably broadened these holdings in applying them to specific 
circumstances.101 Moreover, it is no longer open to serious ques- 
tion that the right to vote in a primary election is as protected 
against state encroachment as is the right to vote in the general 
election. 
The early attitude of the Supreme Court toward the status 
of primary elections may be gleaned from Newberry u. United 
States.lo2 There the Court found that 
[primaries] are in no sense elections for an office, but merely 
methods by which party adherents agree upon candidates 
whom they intend to offer and support for ultimate choice by 
all qualified electors. General provisions touching elections in 
constitutions or statutes are not necessarily applicable to 
primaries-the two things are radically different.los 
The Court held that article I, section 4 of the Constitution, giv- 
ing Congress power to regulate the manner of holding elections 
for the House of Representatives and the Senate, did not em- 
96. Id. at 561-62 (1964). 
97. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
98. Id. at 17. 
99. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
100. Id. at 670. - 
101. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residence require- 
ment for voting found unconstitutional); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 
U.S. 621 (1969) (a state may not deny the right to vote to a citizen because he does not 
own or lease taxable realty). 
102. 256 U.S. 232 (1921). 
103. Id. at 250. 
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power Congress to limit expenditures of candidates in senatorial 
primaries.lo4 
As late as 1935 primaries were considered, in the absense of 
state regulation, to be functions of the political parties, which 
were recognized as private associations. In Grovey v. Town- 
send,lo5 the Court held that the decision of the Convention of 
the Texas Democratic Party to exclude all blacks from partici- 
pating in the Democratic primary did not constitute state action 
and therefore was not prohibited by either the fourteenth or the 
fifteenth amendments. This ruling came despite the Court's ear- 
lier decisions in Nixon u. Herndon106 and Nixon v. Condon.lo7 In 
Herndon a Texas law declaring blacks ineligible to vote in the 
Democratic primary was held to violate the fourteenth amend- 
ment. In Condon a subsequent Texas statute which likewise ex- 
cluded blacks by allowing the Democratic Party executive com- 
mittee to determine its voting membership was also found to 
violate the equal protection clause. In neither Herndon nor Con- 
don, however, did the Court define "primary" as part of the 
electoral process. 
The judicial view represented by Grovey underwent a radi- 
cal change beginning with United States v. Classic.lo8 The Court 
there overruled its decisions in Newberry and Grovey and held 
that the right to vote in a primary election was entitled to the 
same amount of protection from state abridgement as the right 
to vote in a general election: 
Where the state law has made the primary an integral part of 
the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary effec- 
tively controls the choice, the right of the elector to have his 
ballot counted at the primary, is likewise included in the right 
protected by Article I, § 2. And this right of participation is 
protected just as is the right to vote at the election, where the 
primary is by law made an integral part of the election machin- 
ery, whether the voter exercises his right in a party primary 
104. Substantial disagreement with this point was expressed by the concurring Jus- 
tices. Four Justices would have held that Congress had the power to regulate primary 
elections selecting senatorial nominees. Id. at 267-68 (White, C.J., concurring in part); 
Id. at 291 (Pitney, J., concurring in part, joined by Brandeis and Clarke, J.J.). One Jus- 
tice reserved the question. Id. at 258 (McKenna, J., concurring, but reserving the ques- 
tion of Congress' power under the seventeenth amendment). 
105. 295 US. 45 (1935). 
106. 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
107. 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 
108. 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
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which invariably, sometimes or never determines the ultimate 
choice of the representative.'Oe 
Three years later in Smith v. A l l ~ r i g h t ~ ~ ~  (the third of the 
quartet of cases commonly referred to as the "White Primary" 
cases),ll1 the Supreme Court recognized the significance of the 
primary and the interest of each voter in effective political par- 
ticipation at this decisive stage of the electoral process. In Smith 
the Court held that the exclusion of blacks from the Texas Dem- 
ocratic primaries was state action in violation of the fifteenth 
amendment. Specifically overruling Grouey, the Court finally 
concluded that "the right to vote in . . . a primary for the nomi- 
nation of candidates without discrimination by the State, like 
the right to vote in a general election, is a right secured by the 
Const i t~t ion."~~~ The Court later extended constitutional pro- 
tections to voters in "unofficial" primaries. In Terry u. A d a r n ~ ~ ~ ~  
the Court scrutinized an association of qualified white Demo- 
cratic voters which selected candidates who would then run for 
nomination in the official Democratic primary in Texas. The 
Court held that exclusion of blacks was invalid under the 
fifteenth amendment because they were not permitted to par- 
ticipate in a significant stage of the electoral process114 -"the 
sole stage of the electoral process where the bargaining and in- 
terplay of rival political forces would make [the blacks' vote] 
count." Although Smith and Terry were not fourteenth amend- 
ment cases, the principle is clear. Our argument herein merely 
takes the Terry principle one step further. Just as the exclusion 
from the primary election stage, where effective formation and 
compromise take place, denied the blacks their fifteenth amend- 
ment rights, we suggest that closed primary systems (such as 
Florida's) operate to exclude unaftiliated voters from the deter- 
minative "primary" stage of the electoral process,l16 and thus in- 
109. Id. at 318. 
110. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
111. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); 
Nixon v. Condon, 286 US.  73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
112. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. at 661-62. 
113. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
114. Id. at 484 (plurality opinion of Clark, J., concurring, joined by Vinson, C.J., 
Reed and Jackson, J.J.). 
115. Although to our knowledge no data exist, if it could be shown that a significant 
number of independent voters are either black or members of other minority groups, the 
extension of equal protection analysis to the rights of independents to vote in primary 
elections could be seen merely as the application of the standard adopted by the Court 
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volve an equal protection dimension. 
The essence of the White Primary decisions is the premise 
that determination of who can be voted for in the general elec- 
tion is as important, or more important, as who will be voted for 
in that election. As Justice Pitney has stated, "The likelihood of 
a candidate succeeding in an election without a party nomina- 
tion is practically negligible . . . . As a practical matter, the ulti- 
mate choice of the mass of voters is predetermined when the 
nominations have been made."l16 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has recently noted the winnowing process inherent in primary 
elections and its importance in a full election cycle. In Storer v. 
Brown,l17 the Court upheld the state's move to guarantee that 
the primary election process reduce the number of candidates in 
the general election. Sustaining a state law that refused to per- 
mit defeated primary election candidates to get on the general 
election ballot via a third party candidacy, the Court reasoned, 
The direct party primary in California is not merely an exer- 
cise or warm-up for the general election but an integral part of 
the entire election process, the initial stage in a two-stage pro- 
cess by which the people choose their public officers. It func- 
tions to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen 
candidated ls 
The right of citizens to vote in primaries was aptly described by 
the Third Circuit in Lynch v. Torq~ato:~~@ 
[Tlhe citizen's constitutional right to equality as an elector 
. . . applies to the choice of those who shall be his elected rep- 
resentatives in the conduct of government, not in the internal 
management of political party. It is true that this right extends 
to state regulated and party conducted primaries. However, 
this is because the function of primaries is to select nominees 
for governmental office even though, not because, they are 
party enterprises. The people, when engaged in primary and 
general elections for the selection of their representatives in 
government, may rationally be viewed as the 'state' in action, 
with the consequence that the organization and regulation of 
these enterprises must be such as accord each elector equal 
in the "White Primary" cases. 
116. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 286 (1921) (Pitney, J., concurring in 
part). 
117. 415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
118. Id. at 735. See also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715-16 (1974). 
119. 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965). 
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protection of the 1 a ~ s . l ~ ~  
Although most of the cases in this series121 dealt with black 
voting rights, the underlying principle is that the same set of 
rules which govern the conduct of the general election should 
also operate in the regulation of the nomination process. That 
means that the spirit of the fifteenth amendment should be read 
into the equal protection clause and be applied generally. It is 
valid to maintain that the Court has at least tacitly recognized 
that the right to vote may be rendered meaningless in the ab- 
sence of a correlative right to participate in the nominating pro- 
cess by which candidates are selected. 
It is clear that the presidential primary is far more than a 
mere warm-up for the general election. It  is an integral part of 
the entire selection process-the beginning of a two stage pro- 
cess. It functions to winnow out and finally reject all but the 
chosen candidates for the November election. But this is done in 
the closed primary states without allowing all voters to partici- 
pate. Voters who choose to remain unatliated are barred from 
the most important ballot box, rendering their opportunity in 
the general election, as in November 1980, an empty charade. 
The question is whether that is desirable and also whether it 
jibes with the Constitution. The answer on both counts should 
be in the negative, both for purposes of policy and, for constitu- 
tional reasons. The right to vote can only mean the right to cast 
a meaningful ballot-something not now possible in Florida and 
other closed primary states, and something wrongfully limited 
by LaFollette. 
B. Reasons for Enfranchisement 
Three important arguments stand out in favor of opening 
primaries to all eligible voters, regardless of their willingness to 
declare party atliation. The first, a practical observation, arises 
from an increasing political independence in this nation. The 
second finds root in considerations of our right to privacy. The 
third is that closed primary systems are unjustifiably 
120. Id. at 372. 
121. In addition to the judicial decisions discussed above, Congress enacted two 
pieces of legislation which had the effect of removing restrictions on the franchise: the 
Voting Rights Act of 1%5, Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437 (codified in 42 U.S.C. 9s 1971 
to 1973bb-1 (1976)), and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91- 
285, 84 Stat. 314 (amending 42 U.S.C. $9 1973b, 1973c, 1973aa to 1973bb-4 (1970) 
(amended and repealed in part, 1975)). 
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discriminatory. 
1. Increasing political independence. Many Americans are 
"issue-oriented," and for that reason are not party followers.laa 
Since John F. Kennedy's success in 1960, the personality and 
"media image" of political candidates dominate over political 
party labels. Presidential candidates are marketed through tele- 
vision by advertising specialists. As political analyst David 
Broder observed in 1972, "Television and radio enable well- 
financed candidates to go directly into the homes of voters far 
more effectively than even the most well-organized political ma- 
chine."laS There is strong evidence that the parties are weaken- 
ing."' Indeed, recent polls have indicated a steady rise in the 
number of voters who consider themselves independent.laS 
Fewer than fifty percent of the eligible voters voted for either 
Ronald Reagan or Jimmy Carter in 1980. Moreover, the national 
party-affiliated voters increasingly split tickets in general elec- 
tions-a sign of weakened party loyalty and increased voter in- 
dependence. This trend is documented in an electoral study 
which illustrates "defection rates" for those who profess aftilia- 
tion with a political party.la6 Justice Powell, in his dissenting 
122. D. BRODER, THE PARTY'S OVER (1972). "Seen as not relevant, parties are by- 
passed with the voters making their choices on the basis of their own issue preferences 
and those of the candidates." G. POMPER, VOTERS' CHOICE 183 (1975). See also E. L ~ D ,  
JR. & C. HADLEY, TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 301 (1975) (parties 
are perceived as less than needed by the contemporary electorate). Many voters go be- 
yond merely viewing political parties as irrelevant, but actually distrust them. See A. 
RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION 56 (1973); G. POMPBR, VOTER'S CHOICE 183 
(1975). 
123. D. BRODER, THE PARTY'S OVER 239-40 (1972). The Supreme Court in Buckley 
recognized the "electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass 
media for news and information.'' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at  19. 
124. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 531-32, n.18 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(citing Burnham, The 1976 Election: Has the Crisis Been Adjourned in AMERICAN 
Po~rncs  AND PUBLIC POLICY 19-22 (W. Burnham & W. Weinberg eds. 1976); D. BRODER, 
THE PARTY'S O m  239-40 (1972); Herbers, The Party's Over for the Political Parties, 
N.Y. T i e s ,  Dec. 9, 1979, 8 6 (Magazine), at 159; Pomper, The Decline of the Party in 
American Elections, 92 POL. SOC. Q. 21, 40-41 (1977)). 
125. Perhaps this is also caused by the lack of discernible differences in ideology 
between the major parties. "Political parties in this country traditionally have been char- 
acterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and membership." Rosario v. Rockefel- 
ler, 410 U.S. 752, 769 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting). Three Justices joined Powell in the 
dissent. 
126. N. NIE, S. VERB&, & J. PeTRocuc, THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER 52 (1976). 
Similarly, a 1952 survey reported 74% of the electorate as party regulars in voting for 
state and local offices. By 1974, however, that percentage had dropped to 42%. E. L ~ D ,  
JR. & C. Hmm, TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 293-96 (1975). 
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opinion in Rosario v. Rockefeller,ln recognized the trend toward 
greater voter independence: "Partisan political activities do not 
constantly engage the attention of large numbers of Americans, 
especially as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive 
than issues and qualities of individual candidates."la8 In sum, 
the voter evaluates candidates on the basis of information and 
impressions conveyed by the mass media, and "acts as an indi- 
vidual, not a member of c~llectivity."~~~ 
2. Right to privacy. Another important reason for abolishing 
the closed primary system is that it violates the constitutional 
right to privacylS0 and secrecy of the ballot by forcing voters to 
declare publicly their party preferences. It is clear that 
[olne simple recognition of privacy's importance to self- 
governance is the curtain on the voting booth. But the shelter 
of privacy is needed for more than the casting of the formal 
vote, both because there are other ways of registering self-gov- 
erning choices and because the process of reaching a decision 
does not take place only a t  the moment of formal choice regis- 
tering; it is a continuous process which extends from the re- 
ceipt of each item of information from a speaker to each 
choice, formal or informal, which the citizen registers. He who 
performs his listening and deciding functions in a glass house 
is coerced by public opinion, whether anyone is actually look- 
ing in or not. If every magazine he reads, every rally he at- 
tends, every person he speaks to might somehow become a 
matter of public knowledge, he would feel inhibiting pressure. 
The pressure is the same as that felt by a member of the 
NAACP in Alabama when he fears that the fact of his mem- 
bership will be publicized.lS1 
Yet, in a closed primary system, the names of publicly declared 
127. 410 US. 752 (1973). In Rosario the Court merely held that a state may estab- 
lish a public declaration of party affiliation as a prerequisite to voting in a party primary 
in order to prevent raiding. 
128. Id. at  771 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
129. Note, The Constitutionality of Non-Member Voting, in Political Primary 
Elections, 14 WILLAMET~E L.J. 259, 289 (1978), (citing N. NIE, S. VERBA, J. PETROCIK, 
THE CHANGING A ~ R I C A N  VOTER 347 (1976)). 
130. See, e.g., West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624 (1943) (declaring that 
a state statute compelling each public school student to pledge allegiance to the flag 
violated the first amendment). The Court stated, "[Ilf there is any fixed star in our con- 
stitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein." Id. at  642. 
131. Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1466-67 (1973). 
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voters appear on a "poll list" of a particular political party. 
These poll lists are public documents and as such, are available 
both for public inspection and sale.lS2 It is not surprising that 
many people are unwilling to declare party preference because of 
fear of undue pressure or harassment from employers, business 
associates, social acquaintances or opposing party members.lM 
In the few states, including Wisconsin, where the legisla- 
tures have adopted an open primary system, voters are not re- 
quired to state publicly a party preference. Each voter makes a 
choice of party in the privacy of the voting booth. It is this im- 
portant essence of the system, rather than its particular form, 
that characterizes the open primary. As the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court recognized, "It is . . . the 'private declaration' of party 
preference in the voting booth, as compared with a public, re- 
corded declaration, that characterizes the Wisconsin presidential 
preference vote as an open primary."la 
In guaranteeing a private primary ballot, the open primary 
law serves an interest fundamental to democracy-privacy of po- 
litical preferences and convictions.136 Indeed, this right of pri- 
vacy was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Buckley 
132. At least one court has observed that compiling lists of supporters and nonsup- 
porters for campaigning, polling, patronage and other uses may be very helpful to a po- 
litical organization. Nader v. SchafTer, 417 F. Supp. 837,848 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd mem., 
424 U.S. 989 (1976). See also C. MERIUAM & H. GOSNELL, THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 
288 (1940). 
For a good discussion of compelled disclosure through poll lists, see Skornicka, State 
Action in Presidential Candidate Selection, 1976 U. WIS. L. REV. 1269, 1296-97. 
133. In LaFo22ette two independent voters filed an amici curiae brief with the 
United States Supreme Court. James MacDonald and Elliott Maraniss presented the 
"interests of independent voters who wish to participate in presidential primaries, but 
who decline to afEliate with an organized party." Brief of Amici Curiae James MacDon- 
ald and Elliott Maraniss Urging Affirmance at  2, Democratic Party v. LaFollette, Docket 
No. 79-1631 (February 25, 1981). Both Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Maranks have been 
independent voters for nearly twenty years. Neither can wholeheartedly support the 
goals of either major party. As a journalist wishing to maintain impartiality, the interest 
of Mr. Maraniss in not publicly affiliating with a major party is particularly compelling. 
134. LaFollette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 485, 287 N.W.2d. 519, 523 
(1980). 
For a discussion of this and a detailed analysis of the open primary, see Comment, 
The Constitutionality of Non-Member Voting in Political Primary Elections, 14 Wm- 
LAMEW L.J. 259 (1978); Comment, Open Versus Closed Primaries: A Dilemma in the 
Illinois Election Process, 1977 S.  ILL. L.J. 210. 
135. The Court has long held fundamental the right of privacy of association and 
beliefs. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 
(1960). 
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u. Valeo.lM There, the Court found this right to be "fundamen- 
tal in a free society," and the advent of the secret ballot to be 
"one of the great political reforms."137 The Buckley Court, in 
discussing the disclosure requirements of the Federal Election 
Campaign A d  of 1971,lS8 recognized that compelled disclosure 
"can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guar- 
anteed by the First Amendment."13@ Drawing from a long line of 
cases invalidating various disclosure requirements,140 the Court 
established a balancing test between the infringement of first 
amendment rights and the governmental interest asserted. As 
applied here, the burden that compelled disclosure imposes on 
the independent primary voter must be balanced against the as- 
sociational interests of the national party and its members or 
the general interests of the state. 
What societal interest does a closed primary further? It is 
by no means clear that any such group interest, as opposed to 
associational interest, is served by the closed primary. Since pri- 
mary elections are an integral part of the electoral process, they 
must be held to a standard of serving the large interest of all 
people rather than a small group of people who call themselves 
Democrats or Republicans. 
Even though advocates of a closed primary would argue that 
an open primary permits non-party members to have a signifi- 
cant effect on the selection of a Democrat or Republican presi- 
dential candidate141 and that the open primary therefore violates 
136. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
137. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 237 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
138. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 
(1972), has been amended as follows: Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,88 Stat. 1263 (1974); Federal Election Campaign Act Amend- 
ments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,90 Stat. 475; Federal Election Campaign Act Amend- 
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1655; Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980). The Act is codified as 
amended beginning at  2 U.S.C. 5 431. 
139. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). 
140. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little 
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
141. One writer states that a political party may advance its own and its supporters' 
ideology through the nomination of a candidate and that this freedom would be mean- 
ingless if parties could not determine that ideology. Note, Presidential Nominating Con- 
ventions: Party Rules, State Law and the Constitution, 62 GEO. L.J. 1621, 1626-27 
(1974). Another commentator argues that because a major aspect of the primary is the 
furtherance of associational interest, the primary election should express the party mem- 
bers' consensus. Note, Primary Elections: The Real Party in Interest, 27 RUTGERS L. 
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the constitutionally guaranteed freedom to associate for political 
purposes, that is not the critical point. It is true that in Cousins 
v. Wigoda,14' Justice Brennan described the protected right of a 
major party and its adherents this way: 
[Ilts adherents enjoy a constitutionaUy protected right of polit- 
ical association. "There can no longer be any doubt that free- 
dom to associate with others for the common advancement of 
political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. . . . The 
right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an 
integral part of this basic constitutional freedom."14g 
The national political party is thus interested in protecting the 
integrity of the primary as a party function protecting its associ- 
ational interests "from intrusion by those with adverse political 
principles."144 The Constitution and the electoral process it pro- 
tects speak, however, in terms of the individual's rights as a unit 
of what Professor Karst calls a "national citizenship." Permit- 
ting all voters to participate in party primaries does not dilute 
the right of association one iota. The exact contrary is more ac- 
curate. No person, as in Terry u. Adam, is being denied the 
right to act collectively with others. All that would be done is to 
prevent the collectivity-the party-from discriminating against 
those who choose to march alone to the ballot box. 
The argument that a contemporaneous, publicly recorded 
statement of party preferences is necessary to maintain the in- 
tegrity of associational rights is therefore specious. The Wiscon- 
sin Supreme Court correctly observed that this objection is de- 
pendent upon two unsupported assumptions: "[Flirst, that 
voters who do not have a commonality of interest with the party 
will attempt to vote on the party ballot in sufEcient numbers to 
jeopardize the primary's integrity; and second, that a contempo- 
raneous declaration of party preference is a necessary and effec- 
tive way of preventing this result."146 I t  should be noted that a 
national party has the burden of persuading the court that a 
REV. 298, 306 (1974). Parties, however, are "mere vague electoral alliances." L. THUROW, 
THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 212 (1980). 
142. 419 U.S. 477 (1975). 
143. Id. at 487. See also the concurring opinion of Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and 
Chief Justice Burger at 491. 
144. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1952). 
145. LaFollette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 495, 287 N.W.2d 519, 533 
(1980). 
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particular state statute infringes upon a national party's associa- 
tional rights.146 Analysis of the closed primary indicates that 
such a system cannot support a compelling societal interest, and, 
on the other hand, the open primary system protects vital indi- 
vidual interests. 
There are three categories of voters who may be charged as 
not having a commonality of interest with a national party. One 
such category is made up of "raiders." "Raiding" has been de- 
fined by the Supreme Court as "the practice whereby voters in 
sympathy with one party vote in another's primary in order to 
distort that primary's results."147 Raiding, when it occurs, 
presents a serious problem because it "is an act hostile to the 
party; it amounts to a fraud on the party. It deprives the party 
and its members of the purpose of their association."148 Yet, 
documented instances of raiding are relatively rare". and are 
not a significant problem or serious threat to party integrity. In- 
deed, the National Democratic Party has acknowledged that 
there is no real evidence to show the existence of raiding.lS0 
146. Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191, 195 (1979). See also American Party of 
Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 790 (1974). 
147. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973). 
148. 93 Wis. 2d at 506, 287 N.W.2d a t  532. In 1910 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
upholding its open primary law, commented on raiding: "That any considerable follow- 
ing of one political creed will deliberately desert their own party at  the primary to foist 
an unworthy set of candidates on a rival party presupposes a degree of moral turpitude 
that we cannot presume to exist." Van Alstine v. Frear, 125 N.W. 961, 969 (Wis. 1910). 
149. Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111,1173 (1975) (''Al- 
though there are documented cases of organized raiding [citing no cases after 19501, the 
recent decline of party machines capable of inducing their members to raid and the ab- 
sence of durational requirements in many states suggest that the likelihood of raiding 
may be overstated.") 
Indeed, raiding is not a serious threat. See Skornicka, State Action in Presidential 
Candidate Selection, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 1269, 1301-03; Democratic Party of the United 
States v. LaF'ollette, 101 S. Ct. 1010,1026 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting). See also LaFol- 
lette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 495 n.32, 287 N.W.2d 519, 533 n.32, (1980), 
citing Note, The Constitutionality of Non-Member Voting in Primary Elections, 14 
WIU~~ME~TE L.J. 259, 282-86 (1978); Adamany, Communication: Cross-Over Voting and 
the Democratic Party's Reform Rules, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 536, 538 (1976); Note, Pn'- 
mary Elections: The Real Party in Interest, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 298, 307 n.74 (1974); 
Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111,1172-73 (1975); Note, Con- 
stitutional Issues in Durational Party Affiliation Requirements, 25 MAINE L. REV. 147, 
154 (1973). 
150. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION O  PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION A D PARTY STRUC- 
TURE, OPENNESS, PARTICIPATION A D PARTY BUILDING: REFORMS FOR A STRONGER DEMO- 
CRATIC PARTY 68 (1978) (Winograd Commission) ("Some have argued the Republicans 
'raid' Democratic primaries. However, the existence of 'raiding' has never been conclu- 
sively proven by survey research."). 
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A second category of voters presumably not possessing a 
commonality of interest with a party are adherents to the alter- 
native national party or other parties. These are the "crossover" 
voters. Theoretically, the closed primary prevents members of 
one political party from voting on the rival party's ballot-a not 
uncommon occurrence and allegedly harmful under the open 
primary system. Thus, the Democratic Party opposes open 
primaries because of a concern that that delegation allocated ac- 
cording to the primary results would not fairly reflect the divi- 
sion of preferences among "Democratic identifiers in the electo- 
rate."lS1 Yet, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded in 
analyzing data submitted by the Democratic Party, "Wisconsin's 
open primary produces an electorate which is as representative 
(or as unrepresentative) of 'Democratic identifiers in the electo- 
rate' as is the electorate produced by closed primaries and 
caucuses which are acceptable to the National Party."ls9 
Additionally, it seems clear from the Wisconsin experience 
that when a member of one party decides to cross over and vote 
in another party's primary, the vote is cast out of a desire to 
express principled support for a particular presidential candi- 
date. In 1968, for example, Wisconsin Republicans voted for 
Senator Eugene McCarthy in the Democratic primary. Political 
scientist Austin Ranney described the crossover voters this way: 
[They] deserted their party to register their special ap- 
proval of a candidate, or policy associated with a candidate, 
available only in the other party. [Eugene] McCarthy's Repub- 
lican supporters clearly did not vote for him because they 
thought he would be the easiest Democrat for Nixon to beat in 
November; they did so because they liked him and his opposi- 
tion to the Vietnam War.lSs 
151. LaFollette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d at 508, 287 N.W.2d at 534. 
152. Id. The court's conclusion is also supported by past experience in the Wiscon- 
sin primary. In 1968 Senator Eugene McCarthy won the Wisconsin Democratic primary. 
In 1972 Senator George McGovern won the Wisconsin primary and went on to win the 
Democratic nomination on the first ballot. Similarly, in 1976 and 1980, Jimmy Carter 
won the Wisconsin Democratic primary and the nomination of the Democratic primary. 
On the Republican side, Richard Nixon won both the Wisconsin primary and the 
Republican nomination in 1968 and 1972. Similarly, both Gerald Ford in 1976, and Ron- 
ald Reagan in 1980 won the Wisconsin primary and the Republican nomination. 
In short, the winners of the Wisconsin open primary seem to be reflective of the 
views of their respective political parties as confirmed by the national nominating con- 
ventions and are not some sort of aberrant. 
153. Ranney, Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections, 66 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 35 (1972). 
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Studies of the Wisconsin open primary indicate that a small per- 
centage of the total primary voters were persons who chose to 
vote in the other party's primary.'" Moreover, the studies 
demonstrate that the statewide result of the primary election 
was not affected by Republican crossover voting, even though 
the vote was admittedly diluted.156 Justice Powell, dissenting in 
Rosario u. Rockefeller,lw summed up the reasons for voting in 
the other party's primary when he wrote: 
Citizens generally declare or alter party d i a t i o n  for reasons 
quite unconnected with any premeditated intention to disrupt 
or frustrate the plans of a party with which they are not in 
sympathy. Citizens customarily choose a party and vote in 
[the] primary simply because it presents candidates and issues 
more responsive to their immediate concerns and 
 aspiration^.^" 
A third possible category of voters who do not have a com- 
monality of interest are the "independents."158 The declaration 
of preference required by a closed primary appears to be no 
more effective than the open primary in deterring the participa- 
tion of independent voters. Indeed, some studies suggest that in 
closed primary systems, some voters who consider themselves in- 
dependent enroll or register as party members to vote in the pri- 
mary of their choice,lSe It seems clear that voters who do not 
share a commonality of interest with a political party will not 
vote on that party's ballot in sufficient numbers to jeopardize 
the primary's integrity. Even if this were to occur, however, the 
closed primary is an unnecessary and ineffective way of prevent- 
ing this result. 
In Rule 2A of its Delegate Selection Rules for the 1980 Con- 
vention, the Democratic Party regulates participation in the 
delegate selection process by defining Democratic voters as those 
persons "who publicly declare their party preference Democratic 
and have that preference publicly recorded."lm By implication 
154. Hedlund, Cross-Over Voting in a 1976 Open Residential Primary, 41 PUB. 
OPIN. Q. 498, 502, 513 (1979). 
155. Id. at 502-03. 
156. 410 U.S. 752 (1973). 
157. Id. at 769-70 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
158. Those not affiliated or registered with any political party. 
159. Note, The Constitutionality of Non-Member Voting in Primary Elections, 14 
WILLAME~TE L.J. 259,277 n.103,288 (1978); Hedlund, Cross-Over Voting in a 1976 Open 
Residential Primary, 41 PUB. OPIN. Q. 498, 502, 513 (1979). 
160. Delegate Selection Rules for the 1980 Democratic National Convention, Rule 2. 
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the party is saying that it does not want independents to partici- 
pate because they do not share a common interest with voters 
who have publicly affiliated themselves with the party. 
Yet, under Rule 2A, voters are Democratic voters simply if 
they think they are and say they are, even if only for the pur- 
pose of voting in one primary election. Indeed, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court noted that "the [Democratic] Party does not set 
forth any objective standards against which a voter may test his 
or her self-designation. Nor does the National Party set forth 
any subjective standards to guide voters in determining their 
party preference."ldl Under Rule 2A any person of any political 
party or persuasion would be eligible to vote in a Democratic 
primary if that person would be willing to a l i a t e  with the 
Democratic Party for that one primary election. It is difficult to 
perceive the increased benefits of associational righta under this 
system as opposed to the Wisconsin "open primary" system.lda 
"Defining who is and who is not a Republican or Democrat, 
defining the commonality of interest which binds Democrats or 
Republicans, or defining the Republican's or Democrat's com- 
mitment to the party are key issues which have not been re- 
solved by the parties."lq The significance of the declaration of 
party preference is far from clear. Indeed, it is uncertain exactly 
what membership in a political party signals. Contrary to the 
experience of many European democracies and the fears of the 
Founding Fathers,'" the formation of political parties in the 
United States has not exerted a fragmenting effect upon our po- 
litical life. The reason for this is that pluralism within parties, 
rather than pluralism among parties has been a hallmark of 
American politics. 
161. LaFollette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d at  505, 287 N.W.2d at 531. 
162. Justice Powell keenly points out: 
The Wisconsin statute states that "[iln each year in which electors for 
president and vice-president are to be elected, the voters of this state shall be 
given an opportunity to express their preference for the person to be the presi- 
dential candidate of their party." Wis. Stat. 5 8.12(1) (emphasis added). Thus 
the act of voting in the Democratic primary fairly can be described as an act of 
affiliation with the Democratic Party. The real issue in this case is whether the 
party has the right to decide that) only publicly m a t e d  voters may 
participate. 
Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette, 101 S. Ct. 1010, 1023 n.2 (1981) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
163. 93 Wis. 2d at 505, 287 N.W.2d at 531. 
164. See L. DSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES (1967); R. D m ,  
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (1967). 
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Political parties have been viewed not as ideological refuges 
for "true believers," but as groupings of diverse interests joined 
together in a coalition for the purpose of achieving shared politi- 
cal goals. Only under such a pragmatic view could men of such 
diverse ideologies as George Wallace and the late Allard Lowen- 
stein in the Democratic Party, and Ronald Reagan and Pete Mc- 
Closkey in the Republican Party, share the same party a l i a -  
tion?' Given such a non-ideological tradition in party politics, it 
is not surprising that interparty mobility has been a facet of 
American political life. The two major parties with rather nebu- 
lous and informal criteria for party membership have, in the 
United States, created parties broadly composed of "persons 
from all walks of life" and of "all shades of economic and politi- 
cal opinion."lse Thus, it seems that the chief characteristic of 
parties is not the commonality of aims among its membership to 
be advanced by candidates, but rather, as one court stated, it is 
"the direction and control of the struggle for political power 
among men who may have contradictory interests and often mu- 
tually exclusive hopes of securing them. This the parties do by 
institutionalizing the struggle and emphasizing positive mea- 
sures to create a strong and general agreement on policies."167 
Indeed, the intellectual nature of a political party has been char- 
acterized this way: 
It is not concerned with matters of fact, or doctrine, or even 
principle, except as they bear upon the great cause for exis- 
tence: success at the polls. Such organizations contain not only 
men of divergent views; they must also appeal to voters of dif- 
fering opinions, prejudices and loyalties. It is folly to talk of 
finding an actual basis [for political parties] in any set of prin- 
ciples relating to public welfare.lW 
The closed primary's contemporaneous declaration of party 
preference is an "unnecessary and ineffective way to prevent 
raiders, members of an alternative national party, adherents of 
165. It is little wonder that the Supreme Court has noted, "Major parties encompass 
candidates of great diversity. In many situations the label 'Republican' or 'Democrat' 
tells the voter little." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 70 (1976). 
166. H. BONE, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 284 (1955). 
167. Compare Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F. Supp. 794, 805 (D. 
Minn. 1968) with Bendinger v. Oglivie, 335 F. Supp. 572, 575 (N.D. Ill. 1971). 
168. Alexander v. Todman, 337 F.2d 962, 973 (3d Cir. 1964) (citing Robinson, The 
Place of Party in the Political History of the United States, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE 
AMERICAN ~ ~ S T O R I C A L  ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEARS 1927 AND 1928 at 202 (1929)). 
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other parties and independents from voting in a national party 
primary ballot."16s Indeed, there seems to be little difference in 
effect between the closed and open primary systems: 
[Tlhe essence of the legal definitions of party membership 
in the United States will surely continue to be self-designation. 
The fact remains that today even in Illinois, New York, or any 
other closed primary state you are a Democrat if you say you 
are; no one can effectively say you are not; and you can become 
a Republican any time the spirit moves you simply by saying 
that you have become one. You accept no obligations by such a 
declaration; you receive only a privilege-the privilege of tak- 
ing an equal part in the making of a party's most important 
decision, the nomination of its candidates for public office. The 
only remaining restriction is that in some states, such as Cali- 
fornia, you may have to let the registrar of voters know that 
you have changed parties, and you may even have to do so sev- 
eral weeks or even months before your new party's next pri- 
mary. But in many closed primary states you do not even have 
to do that, and in Wisconsin and other open primary states you 
are not allowed to make an official declaration of your party 
membership . . . . One can only conclude that the so-called 
'closed' primaries are just a hair more closed than the so-called 
'open' primaries.170 
The significant difference between the open and closed pri- 
mary is that voters "resent being prohibited from voting if they 
refuse to [make] a party declaration and having their afliliation 
a matter of public record for fear of losing their jobs or risking 
other penalties."171 The difference between the open and closed 
primary is not, as advocates of the closed primary would assert, 
that the open primary permits large numbers of Republicans, in- 
dependents, and other party adherents to vote, for example, on 
the Democratic Party ballot. Rather, the difference is that the 
open primary permits more people to vote for the candidate and 
issues of their choice by allowing a private declaration of party 
preference. Publicly stating a party preference can be a dilemma 
for the independent voter who does not understand the signifi- 
cance of such a public declaration or is unwilling to do so be- 
cause of a fear of undue pressure or harassment. The question 
thus becomes which is worse, the alleged dangers of "crossover" 
169. 93 Wis. 2d at 497, 287 N.W.2d at 535. 
170. A. RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION 166-67 (1975). 
171. W. GOODMAN, THE TWO-PA' SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 207-08 (1964). 
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voting or the disenfranchisement of independent voters unwill- 
ing to record publicly a party preference. It is our contention 
that the closed primary system, in light of the Buckley test, can- 
not support a sufficient governmental interest to justify com- 
pelled disclosure of party affiliation. 
Conversely, the open primary serves a significant state in- 
terest of encouraging voters to participate in selecting the candi- 
dates of political parties which, in turn, fosters democratic 
government.172 As the Supreme Court has pointed out, 
"Preservation of the democratic process is certainly an interest 
protection of which may in some instances justify limitations on 
First Amendment freedoms."17s Historically, the primary was in- 
tended to enlarge citizen participation in the political process 
and remove from political bosses the process of selecting candi- 
dates. Presumably, the legislatures of open primary states be- 
lieve democracy is best served by stimulating political activity 
and that "facilitat[ing] and enlarg[ing] public discussion and 
participation in the electoral process [are] goals vital to a self- 
governing people."174 
It is "ironic," as Justice Powell forcefully pointed out in La- 
Follette, that Rule 2A has the "effect of calling into question a 
state law that was intended itself to open up participation in the 
nominating process and minimize the influence of 'party 
bosses.' "17" The LaFollette decision, with its deference to na- 
tional party rules allows the political bosses to wrest control of 
the nominational process from the hands of the primary voters. 
As David Broder commented, "The justices clearly signaled the 
Democrats that the way is open for them to begin repair of their 
own distorted nominating process by curbing the number of del- 
egates chosen in primaries."176 
172. The National Democratic Party in fact replaced the Wisconsin open primary 
with a closed caucus system in 1980. A similar displacement was made in Michigan, 
which had an open primary system. Only 15,000 people in the state of Michigan partici- 
pated in the Democratic closed caucus. See N.Y. Ties, April 27,1980, at  p. 1, col. 2. By 
comparison, 625,185 people voted in the Wisconsin Democratic primary and 897,464 
voted in the Republican primary. 38 CONG. Q. W. RPTS. 901 (April 5, 1980). Wisconsin 
had the second highest percentage of voter age turnout in its 1976 primary of the 24 
states conducting primaries. A. RANNEY, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMI- 
NATIONS 25 (1977). 
173. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976). 
174. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976). 
175: Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette, 101 S. Ct. 1010, 1022 
(1981) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
176. Broder, But Will They Change Those Rules, Wash. Post, March 1, 1981, 5 C, 
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It has been clear since the NAACP cases were decided,'?' 
that "freedom to associate with others for the common advance- 
ment of political beliefs and ideas is . . . protected by the First 
and Fourteenth A~nendments."~~~ A close corollary to the right 
of association is the right to be free of unwanted association.17@ 
Even though the Court has traditionally tended to limit the 
right of nonparticipation to cases involving personal convictions 
so deeply held as to be considered matters of cons~ience,'~~ in 
recent years it has extended the right to include situations 
where an individual has been required to support a political or 
ideological cause with which the individual simply disagrees.lel 
The Court, in Elrod v. Burns,le4 held that state officials could 
not condition retention of public employment on the afliliation 
with a particular political party. Similarly, in Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education,les the Court held that the first amendment 
prevents the government from requiring objecting public em- 
ployees to contribute to union political or ideological activities 
not germane to collective bargaining.lM Recently, in Branti v. 
Finkel,lB5 the Court likewise upheld the right of public defend- 
ers to be free from coerced political afliliation as a condition of 
employment. This trilogy of cases marks the emergence of a dis- 
tinctive first amendment right to resist coerced participation in 
or support of political or ideological activity. Indeed, the Court 
in Abood said that such a right was "at the heart of the First 
Amendment."le6 Similarly, the independent voter should not be 
at 7, col. 2. 
177. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 US. 415 (1963); Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); 
and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
178. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975) (citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 
U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973)). 
179. One commentator notes that "[tlhis right has most often been asserted in a 
labor law context. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); 
International Ass'n. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Employees 
Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). See also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) 
(attack on the dues requirement under an integrated bar system)." Skornicka, State 
Action in Presidential Candidate Selection, 1976 U. WIS. L. REV. 1269, 1296-97. 
180. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
181. For a thorough treatment of this subject area, see Comment, The Right of 
Ideological Nonassociation, 66 CAL. L. REV. 767 (1978). 
182. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
183. 431- U.S. 290 (1977). 
184. Id. a t  235. 
185. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
186. 431 US. a t  234-35. 
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coerced into joining one of the major parties in order to exercise 
the right to vote in a primary. 
3. Unjustified discrimination. The third reason for en- 
franchising the independent voter is that the closed primary also 
ignores the right of all persons to vote once the state has decided 
to make the right available to some. Membership in either the 
Democratic or Republican parties should not be an admission 
ticket to the primary ballot box. This is especially so, as the Su- 
preme Court said in United States v. Classic,lm "[wlhere the 
state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure 
of choice, or where in fact the primary effectively controls the 
choice."188 After all, political parties are not mentioned, directly 
or indirectly, in the United States Constitution.18@ The drafters 
of the Constitution did not foresee the modern importance of 
political parties in the United States. They were non- 
party-even anti-party-independents. Thus on October 2, 
1780, John Adams, writing to a friend about the new constitu- 
tion for Massachusetts, said: "There is nothing which I dread so 
much as a division of the republic into two great parties, each 
arranged under its leader, and concerting measures in opposition 
to each other. This in my humble apprehension, is to be dreaded 
as the greatest political evil under our constitution."lM The view 
that the rise of political parties was an evil, tending to foment 
strife and discord in the body politic, was widespread. George 
Washington similarly warned his countrymen "in the most sol- 
emn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party,"lel 
and James Madison thought it the principal task of the new 
Constitution to hold the "mischiefs of faction"lea in check. 
The meaning is clear: the independent voter in a closed pri- 
mary state is being denied a fundamental right? That in turn 
187. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
188. Id. at 467. 
189. "Partisan politics bear the imprimatur only of tradition, not the Constitution." 
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 369 n.22 (1976). 
190. 9 J. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 511 (1854). 
191. G. WASHINGTON, Farewell Address, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HIS- 
TORY 169, 172 (H. Commager ed. 1946). 
192. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (J. Madison) at  52 (H. Lodge ed. 1888). Indeed, in the 
early 1790's "most Americans did not want parties." J. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOC- 
RACY 27 (1967). 
193. Ideally, of course, the primary should not only be open, but also have delegates 
allocated in accordance with its results. Although it might be argued, as Justice Powell 
suggests with regard to the Vermont primary, Democratic Party v. LaFollette, 101 S. Ct. 
1010, 1025 n.11 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting), that a nonbinding primary is but an idle 
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can only mean that he is being denied equal protection. But, if 
the Supreme Court so held, a major expansion of equal protec- 
tion could occur-to make the Constitutional standard national 
or interstate rather than intrastate. The time has come for such 
a development. After all, the fourteenth amendment speaks of 
"equal protection of the laws9'-but does not define "laws." Ar- 
guably the Justices would not have to embrace a concept of in- 
terstate equal protection. They could rule that an independent 
voter in a closed primary state was being denied his fourteenth 
amendment rights vis-a-vis other voters in that same state. But 
under the "new" jurisprudence of the Court, even such a limited 
decision would have a general effect. 
Ours is a national citizenship.la4 Justice Bradley, addressing 
the issue of equality in the Slaughter-House Cases, judicially ex- 
pressed the view of such a citizenship: 
A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional 
right to go and reside in any state he chooses, and to claim 
citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with every other 
citizen . . . . He is not bound to cringe to any superior, or to 
pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights 
and privileges enjoyed by other citizens . . . . If a man be de- 
nied full equality before the law, he is denied one of the essen- 
tial rights of citizenship as a citizen of the United States.lS6 
Although Justice Bradley spoke in dissent, his words capture 
nicely the concept of a national citizenship and a "united state." 
gesture; nevertheless, the intense attention of the media and the perception of the people 
in the other states is to the contrary. In his famed August 1974 memorandum outlining 
President Carter's successful 1976 strategy, Hamilton Jordan wrote: 
The press shows an exaggerated interest in the early primaries as they 
represent the first confrontation between candidates . . . We would do well to 
understand the very special and powerful role the press plays in interpreting 
the primary results for the rest of the nation. What is actually accomplished in 
the New Hampshire primary is less important than how the press interprets it 
for the rest of the nation. 
J. WITCOVER, MARATHON 144 (1978). The primary process is important not only as a 
delegate selection process, but also, in this "media age," as a means of creating and 
mtaining the impression of an electable presidential candidate. The independent 
voter in Florida, unlike the independent voter in Wisconsin, is cut out of that process. 
194. See Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. 
REV. 541, 550-51 (1977). 
195. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall. 1872) 36,112-13 (Bradley, J., dissent- 
ing). Professor Karst notes constitutional support for the idea of equal national citizen- 
ship, eg., the prohibition against the granting of titles of nobility by the United States, 
.U.S. CONST., art. I, 5 9, c1. 8; the prohibition against direct federal taxes that are not 
proportional to population, id. § 9, cl. 4. Karst, supra note 194, at 550 n.53. 
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As Professor Karst wrote a century later, "The substantive core 
of the amendment, and of the equal protection clause in particu- 
lar, is a principle of equal citizenship, which presumptively guar- 
antees to each individual the right to be treated by the organ- 
ized society as a respected, responsible, and participating 
member."19e 
Professor Karst maintains that if, after the Civil War, there 
could be any doubt that we are all citizens of the United States, 
that doubt was removed by the fourteenth amendment's explicit 
declaration: "All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside."lP7 Indeed, 
absent that specific command, Karst believes that a spirit of 
national citizenship would prevail, such that we would think of 
ourselves primarily as citizens of the nation, and only second- 
arily of the several states, for "[w]e are all part of one economy; 
we are highly mobile, both in capacity and in inclination; a na- 
tional system of communication hands us the same news and the 
same entertainment; we look to the national government as the 
chief arena for the interplay of political forces."lB8 It is clear that 
these aspects of our nationhood demand a generous view of the 
powers of the national g~vernment.~@@ "And as those expanded 
powers have been exercised, we [Americans] have come to per- 
ceive the obligations of citizenship as running primarily to the 
national polity."200 The principle of equal national citizenship 
means more than the correction of abuses by the state; the heart 
of the principle is that citizens have the right to equal treatment 
by the government. Equality in the electoral process is a crucial 
a rmat ion  of the equal worth of citizens.201 
Some may object that such a concept of equal protection 
would strike a body blow at federalism and state sovereignty. 
Yet, despite recent Supreme Court decisions in support of 
196. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977). 
197. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
198. Karst, supra note 194, at 550-51. 
199. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-46,59 HARV. L. 
REV. 645, 883 (1946). 
200. Karst, supra note 194, at 551. 
201. "To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a 
citizen." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964), cited in Karst, supra note 196, at 
29. 
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states' rights, federalism as it was once known is dead."02 Among 
other factors, a national income tax, technological imperatives, 
and immersion of the nation in world affairs point to a conclu- 
sion that the several states are political  anachronism^.^^ If peo- 
ple truly believed in federalism, there would be no New York 
City going to the federal government to avoid bankruptcy, no 
Chrysler seeking a similar financial bailout, and no state and lo- 
cal governments receiving enormous grants-in-aid from the fed- 
eral government. The death knell for federalism occurred long 
ago; it should be recognized and accepted. 
Moreover, the decline of federalism is apparent in the elec- 
toral process. Uniform, nationwide standards for electoral prac- 
tices and voting rights have increasingly supplanted diverse elec- 
tion laws.2M This result runs contrary to a long history of state 
control in conducting elections and defining the scope of the 
franchise. One need only look at four developments in the last 
twenty-five years to understand how this transfer of power away 
from the states has occurred: constitutional amendments;806 Su- 
preme Court de~isionmaking;~~ congressional legislation;207 and 
the Federal Election Comrnis~ion.~~~ 
202. Strong national unity was recognized by Justice Holmes: 
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost the power to 
declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the union would be imperiled if we 
could not make the declaration as to the laws of the several states. 
J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL L W36 (1975). 
203. Currently, a national economic system is superimposed on a decentralized po- 
litical order. Politics and law tend to follow economics; the inexorable result is that the 
states will become even less important in the future. See A. IMIUER, SOCIAL CHANGE AND 
FUNDAMENTAL L W 43-95 (1979); Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution 
of Control, 64 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1980). 
204. For a complete discussion of this subject, see Claude, Nationalizing Electoral 
Process Standards: Is an Obituary for State's Rights Premature? 13 IDAHO L. REV. 373 
(1977). 
205. See note 89 supra. 
206. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); 
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
207. E.g., the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,86 Stat. 3 
(1972), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-443. Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970) (amended and repealed in part in 1975); Civil Rights Act 
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
208. The Commission is the independent agency of the United States government 
charged with primary and exclusive jurisdiction to implement civil enforcement of the 
federal election laws. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(l) (1976). The laws over which the Commission 
has civil enforcement jurisdiction are the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as 
amended, supra note 139; the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. 8s 
9001-9013 (1976); and the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 
U.S.C. g§ 9031-9042 (1976). 
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The federalism argument also ignores that the nomination 
of a presidential candidate is not a regional or state function but 
rather a national function of the national parties. It is clear that 
the National Democratic and Republican Parties are no more 
than loose federations of state parties. The nomination of a 
presidential candidate once every four years is perhaps the only 
national organizational effort undertaken by the national par- 
ties. The procedure used by both the major parties is clearly a 
nationwide process. Political science studies have noted that the 
"argument for recognition of state sovereignty in a national po- 
litical convention is specious."a0@ Moreover, to analogize between 
a state whose sovereignty in the electoral college is constitution- 
ally established, ande the state political party to the national po- 
litical party is inappropriate. It has been concluded that "[a] na- 
tional political party has its federal aspects, such as its 
dependence on state victories to give it the electoral votes neces- 
sary for winning a presidential election. But in its national con- 
vention its chief business, the nomination and election of a Pres- 
ident, is an operation more national than federal.''210 
Enough has been said to show that voting is indeed a funda- 
mental right, and that voting in primaries should be included in 
that right. As long as the two-party system continues, which 
may not be more than a few years, a further point can be made: 
all voters should be able to cast a ballot in primaries for one of 
the candidates in each party. There is no logical reason why 
even the Wisconsin system should not be expanded that far. We, 
however, do no more than mention the point here; and do not 
argue for it at this time. Our net conclusion is that there are 
solid legal and policy grounds for fully enfranchising the inde- 
pendent voters in America. 
That need not take a constitutional amendment. The Su- 
preme Court can do it in an appropriate case brought, say, by an 
independent voter in Florida. What external standards of judg- 
ment should the Justices apply should such a case eventuate? 
We suggest that the Wisconsin system be enunciated as the con- 
stitutional minimum. And, as suggested above, that part of the 
209. P. DAVID, R. GOLDMAN, & R. Bmu, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL PARTY CONVEN- 
no~s 177 (1960). 
210. Id. 
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Wisconsin system which allows delegate selection by caucus, 
without regard to the primary, violates fundamental principles 
of fairness. In short, "interstate equal protection" should be the 
law, by giving to the word "laws" in the fourteenth amendment 
an expansive reading. Whether that is a "neutral principle," as 
some people who should know better plump for,"" we do not 
say. The point is that a nation that calls itself democratic, that 
has a commitment to equality, and that seeks to be a model for 
nations elsewhere can no longer suffer the actual disenfranchise- 
ment of what is perhaps the largest-certainly the fastest grow- 
ing-group of voters. There is nothing sacrosanct in the two- 
party system; or, indeed, in parties themselves. 
In saying all of this, in advocating an interstate standard for 
equal protection, we recognize, with Jeremy Bentham, that 
"[tlhe establishment of perfect equality is a chimera; all we can 
do is to diminish inequality."a1a Interstate equal protection is 
one way to do that. Americans living in the zero-sum society de- 
serve no less. Surely, it is the logical extension of the Court's 
pronouncement in Cooper v. Aaron that its decisions are "the 
law of the land." Equal protection is an area where a fundamen- 
tal conception should be developed, in Cardozo's words, "to 
their uttermost conclusions."a1s 
A further point deserves mention. There is no need at this 
time to suggest all possible human rights that might be consid- 
ered to be so fundamental as to fall under the rubric of inter- 
state equal protection. Once the principle is established, as it 
can be with the right to vote, then the other areas of concern can 
be analyzed with an eye toward determining whether they too 
should receive nationwide protection. The concept of national 
citizenship in a "united state" that is the United States requires 
precisely that. 
Some may argue that if regulation of political parties comes 
it should be by statute, not be judicial decision. If the elected 
representatives of the people in Congress can be persuaded to 
enact a comprehensive voting rights law that would go not only 
211. See, e-g., Greenwalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1978), which is a latter-day celebration of Weschler, Toward Neu- 
tral Principles of Constitutioncrl Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (rightly called "verbally 
muddled" by Anthony R. Blackshield of the Faculty of Law, University of Sydney). See 
A. MILLER, SOCIAL CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 170 (19'79). 
212. J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 120 (1931). 
213. SELECTB~ WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN ATHAN CARDOZO 294 (M. Hall ed. 1947). 
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to the right to cast a ballot (as in the Voting Rights Act of 1965) 
but also to the ways in which candidates are selected, then there 
would be no need for the Court to intervene.214 Absent such a 
statute (and the likelihood of one being enacted is remote at 
best) the Court is the only avenue open to those who are disen- 
franchised by the present system. The Supreme Court has al- 
ready involved itself in the election process, principally in the 
White Primary and Legislative Reapportionment Cases; hence, 
there is no good reason why it should not enter this "political 
thicket."21s The essential argument here is not so much over 
what should be done, but over how it can be effected. Those who 
argue for a quietistic role for the Supreme Court will, of course, 
abhor interstate equal protection and call for a legislative resolu- 
tion;"@ but those who see a larger role for the Court, such as 
Professor John Hart Ely with his "representation-reinforcing" 
theory of judicial review,"17 just might accept the basic conclu- 
sions of this article. 
214. The extreme deference the LaFollette Court showed to the political party sys- 
tem poses the question of who, if anyone, can control these private governments. Could, 
for example, Congress legislate a national or regional primary system? Arthur Schles- 
inger Jr. suggests that such a measure "might well administer the coup de grace" to the 
political parties and, would almost certainly be opposed by the major parties. Arthur S. 
Schlesinger, Crisis of the Party System: XI, Wall St. J., May 14, 1979, at  14, col. 4. If so, 
would the principle of LaFollette ("a State, or a court, may not constitutionally substi- 
tute its own judgment for that of a party") prohibit or foreclose Congress from doing 
that? 
215. Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
216. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); A. BICKEL, 
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975). 
217. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
